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The Personhood Argument Against
Polygraph Evidence, Or "Even If the
Polygraph Really Works, Will Courts
Admit the Results?"
by
JAMES R. MCCALL*
Seventy five years ago Dean Wigmore wrote: "If there is ever
devised a psychological test for the valuation of witnesses, the law will
run to meet it." After sixty five years of reform and general liberali-
zation of the law of evidence, Justice Hans Linde of the Oregon Su-
preme Court saw the matter somewhat differently: "I doubt the un-
easiness about electrical lie detectors would disappear even if they
were refined to place their accuracy beyond question. Indeed, I
would not be surprised if such a development would only heighten
the sense of unease and the search for plausible legal objections."'
The passage is from the Justice's remarkable concurring opinion in
State v. Lyon. Given Linde's deserved reputation as one of the na-
tion's most scholarly judges, it is curious that the opinion has drawn
no previous academic attention.2 The opinion breaks new ground for
honesty and lucidity in the literature documenting the reaction of
American courts to the development of the purported science of
polygraphy.
This judicial reaction has been one of resistance on an historic
scale, marked by a general refusal to acknowledge or answer the cen-
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of Law, B.A.
Pomona College, 1958; J.D. Harvard Law School, 1962.
1. State v. Lyon, 744 P.2d 231,238 (Or. 1987) (Linde, J., concurring).
2. Justice Linde was a well known law professor at the University of Oregon prior to
his appointment. Following his retirement from the Oregon Supreme Court seven years
ago, he has served as an adjunct professor at Willamette University Law School in Salem,
Oregon. Linde's concurring opinion came to the author's attention because it was repro-
duced in D.H. KAYE, SCIENCE IN EVIDENCE 284-91 (1997). This article is the first aca-
demic comment that Linde's concurrence has received.
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tral claim made by those litigants who have offered polygraph tests in
evidence. Thus, with only a few recent exceptions, American courts
have not addressed polygraph proponents' claim that polygraph test-
ing constitutes an application of scientific principles that produces
scientific evidence when reliably pursued. Instead, the judiciary has
steadily refused to consider or respond to the "claim of science" made
by proponents of forensic polygraph testing. Before Justice Linde's
concurrence, there was no explanation offered in judicial opinions for
this refusal to confront the claim of science. In Lyon, Justice Linde
articulated the previously unexpressed and provided a basis for dis-
cussing the extreme judicial resistance to the polygraph claim of sci-
ence. Although this author disagrees with Justice Linde's position.
there can be no doubt that the Justice performed a great service by
expressing what appears to be the core concern of the American judi-
ciary on the subject of polygraph evidence.
It is well known that polygraph evidence has been treated as an
"evidentiary pariah"' since the famous Frye v. United States opinion
of 1923.' However, the surprising extent and vigor of the "search for
plausible legal objections ' to avoid consideration of the claim to sci-
entific status made by polygraph proponents is unappreciated. The
1993 opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Mer-
rell Dow finally put an end to the indefensible misreading of the Frye
holding on admissibility of polygraph evidence.6 However, the irra-
tional judicial attitude of seven decades that supported that misread-
ing has persisted. In fact, one of the irrational, but traditional, "plau-
sible legal objections" for refusing to consider the science claim of
polygraph proponents appears in a slightly modified form in very re-
cent polygraph admissibility opinions]
The subject for consideration at this conference has been the
place of truth among the possible goals of the law of evidence. The
question of whether there is any legitimate rival for truth as the
dominant objective of the law of evidence can be put aside for the
purpose of appreciating the irrational quality of the judicial resistance
to polygraphy. If truth is even a significant objective of the trial proc-
ess, judges should have traditionally given the most serious and con-
3. The phrase was first used in Whitherspoon v. Superior Court, 184 Cal. Rptr. 615.
621 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
4. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
5. To use Linde's telling phrase. Lyon, 744 P.2d at 238 (Linde, J., concurring).
6. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). See also
infra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 17-26 and accompanying text.
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certed attention to possible means of reliably determining if a witness
has been consciously deceptive in answering relevant questions. Over
a seventy-year period, however, courts have studiously avoided a
careful review of polygraph proponents' claim of a scientific means of
detecting conscious lying and, conversely, conscious truth telling.
If the hostility to rational consideration of the polygraph science
claim continues at traditional levels, the answer to the question posed
by the alternative title to this piece will be "No, courts will not admit
polygraph results in evidence even if the polygraph really works."
There are, however, enough signs of life in the collective judicial
thinking on the subject to support a far more optimistic view. Before
discussing that optimistic view, a number of topics need to be consid-
ered to provide support and context.
The first topic to be discussed is the history, very briefly stated,
of the judicial search for "plausible legal objections" to keep the
courts free of polygraph evidence. This history clearly shows that
with few exceptions, American courts have not been able to approach
polygraph evidence on the basis of what proponents claim that it is-
a new form of scientific evidence. This was true before the Daubert
opinion, and the post-Daubert treatment of polygraph evidence re-
veals that the reluctance to deal with the claim of scientific status for
polygraphy remains strong. Whether polygraph testing produces
"scientific knowledge" is a question apart from the matter of why
American courts have steadfastly refused to consider the question of
whether polygraph testing produces scientific knowledge, or, to state
the question in pre-Daubert terms, whether polygraph testing "[has]
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."8
The historical review of polygraph treatment is followed by a
brief consideration of the immediate future of polygraph law and the
most obvious of the probable legal developments that will occur when
and if courts eventually admit polygraph evidence, in anything like its
present form, as scientific evidence. This paper then reviews the con-
text for the argument of Justice Linde, which is principally the Ore-
gon Supreme Court's decision in the Lyon case. Justice Linde's per-
sonhood argument is the next topic, followed by this author's
response to that argument. The paper concludes with a statement of
a "more optimistic view" of the future of polygraph evidence admis-
sibility than would be supported by those who agree with the person-
hood objection.
8. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
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I. The History of Judicial Resistance to Consideration of
Polygraph Evidence as a Form of Novel Scientific Evidence
A. "Plausible Legal Objections" Before Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Probably the most inexplicable objection to considering the sci-
ence claim used by American courts during the first half century fol-
lowing Frye v. United States was the patently insupportable notion
that the Frye opinion denied admissibility to polygraph evidence for
all time.9 This concept was supplemented and eventually succeeded
by three other seemingly plausible legal objections to maintain the
denial position.'
The three latter-day objections were, and to some degree con-
tinue to be, that polygraph evidence will be "unduly persuasive" to
juries," that admission of such evidence will lead to great confusion
and needless consumption of trial time in the form of a "trial of the lie
detector,'2 and that polygraph evidence is just not accurate.' 3 All
three positions conflict with basic principles of American evidence
law, and it is hard to imagine that these objections would have been
generally honored in connection with any other type of evidence. 4
9. See, e.g., United States v. Frogge, 476 F.2d 969, 970 (5th Cir. 1973) ("[T]he rule is
well established in federal criminal cases that the results of lie detector tests are inadmissi-
ble.") (citing United States v. Rodgers, 419 F.2d 1315, 1319 (10th Cir. 1969): Frye v.
United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)); United States v. Skeens, 494 F.2d 1050, 1053
(D.C. Cir. 1974) ("The leading case in this Circuit is Frye v. United States ... which holds
[polygraph] tests inadmissible. This case has been followed uniformly in this and other
Circuits and there has never been any successful challenge to it in any federal court.").
10. For a fuller discussion and elaborate citations supplementing this brief discussion
of the objections to polygraphs, see James R. McCall, Misconceptions and Reevaluation-
Polygraph Admissibility After Rock and Daubert, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 363, 397-402.
11. Opinions reciting this reason abound. See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 526
F.2d 161, 168 (8th Cir. 1975) ("When polygraph evidence is offered in evidence at trial, it
is likely to be shrouded with an aura of near infallibility, akin to the ancient oracle of Del-
phi.").
12. This reason has also appeared in numerous opinions. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Fatalo, 191 N.E.2d 479, 481 (Mass. 1963) ("[O]n the introduction of such evidence a trial
could descend into a battle of experts on the probative value of the polygraph test rather
than a determination of the guilt or innocence of a defendant. The end result, in all likeli-
hood, would be confusion instead of enlightenment.").
13. See, e.g., Fulton v. State, 541 P.2d 871, 872 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975) ("[I]n light of
the potential unreliability of polygraph examinations... we feel that in all future cases the
introduction into evidence of polygraph examination results for any purpose ... will be
error.").
14. As to the first, the degree of persuasiveness of otherwise admissible evidence is
not a concern for the court in determining admissibility. In invoking the unduly persua-
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Nonetheless, the 1992 executive order of the President of the United
States that prohibited U.S. military courts from admitting polygraph
evidence was based upon each and every one of the three latter-day
objections. 5 This executive order will be the subject of the presently
pending United States v. Scheffer decision of the United States Su-
preme Court.6 The probable effect of the Scheffer opinion is dis-
cussed below.'
B. Indications of Judicial Resistance After Daubert
With some notable exceptions,"8 courts have continued to view
polygraph evidence as something other than a novel form of what is
purported to be scientific evidence. On the other hand, however, a
review of the approach taken in recent opinions from the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals toward polygraph evidence supports a guardedly
optimistic view that the science claim of polygraph proponents will be
seriously addressed in the near future. While the Fifth Circuit is
clearly moving toward mandating the type of reliability assessment of
polygraph evidence that Daubert appears to command, the most im-
portant opinion from the Fifth Circuit contains a troubling element
that is contrary to the general approach requiring a wholehearted
consideration of the science claim.
It should be noted that the Fifth Circuit had a pre-Daubert his-
sive ground, courts were responding to what is termed the "undue deference" concern un-
der the Federal Rules of Evidence. Regarding the second ground, if polygraph results are
credible they should be admitted in the same way that conflicting medical testimony is
commonly heard by juries. Finally, the "lack of accuracy" ground appears to be persua-
sive but actually represents confusion on the part of trial courts that were reluctant to base
their denial of admissibility solely on the general acceptance test. If a test was generally
accepted in the relevant scientific community, a trial court's opinion of the accuracy of the
test would be irrelevant.
15. Rule 707 of the Military Rules of Evidence was issued by Exec. Order No. 12,
767, 56 Fed. Reg. 30,284. The reasons given for the issuance of the Rule are found in
Manual for Courts Martial, U.S. (1984), Change 5 (Nov. 15,1991) at 11.
16. The United States Supreme Court heard oral argument in Scheffer on November
3, 1997.
17. See infra Part II.A.
18. Among federal trial courts, there have been several recent in-depth considera-
tions of the science claim. See United States v. Crumby, 895 F. Supp. 1354, 1364 (D. Ariz.
1995) (same); United States v. Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. 877, 878 (D.N.M. 1995) (admitting
polygraph evidence); Myers v. Arcudi, 947 F. Supp. 581 (D. Conn. 1996) (denying admis-
sion to polygraph evidence). Although there are almost no reported state court opinions
addressing the science claim, the Connecticut Supreme Court recently reviewed a number
of published studies in affirming a trial court's refusal to hold a reliability assessment
hearing on an offer of polygraph evidence. State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 759-68 (Conn.
1997).
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tory of relatively enlightened consideration of polygraph admissibil-
ity. That Circuit recognized the usefulness of polygraph evidence in a
non-jury trial context almost ten years ago, 9 and relatively early,
abandoned the pretense that Frye permanently established the denial
position for all federal courts." Finally, the Fifth Circuit never
adopted the illogical position that stipulated polygraph results should
be admitted regardless of whether the results were a form of scientific
evidence, a position taken by several other appellate courts:
This history would have led observers to predict that the Fifth
Circuit would be one of the first federal appellate courts to require
lower trial courts to directly consider the polygraph science claim
following Daubert. More technically, the prediction would have been
that a consideration of the science claim would be compelled by an
appellate opinion authorizing district courts to admit polygraph evi-
dence if a Daubert reliability assessment proved that polygraph test-
ing was based upon principles that constitute scientific knowledge and
the proponent proved that the specific polygraph test at issue in the
case was produced by a reliable application of those principles. The
Fifth Circuit did just this in its opinion in United States v. Posado2 in
1995, the first reported opinion from any trial or appellate court to
correctly apply the holding in Daubert to an offer of polygraph evi-
dence.23 Unfortunately, the Posado opinion also contained an indica-
tion of continued resistance to the full acceptance of the terms of the
19. See Bennett v. City of Grand Prairie, 883 F.2d 400, 405-06 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding
that magistrates could consider polygraph evidence in deciding whether to issue arrest
warrants). The Fifth Circuit was also among the first to recognize the significance of poly-
graph testing under the Brady rule. See United States v. Lindell, 881 F.2d 1313, 1326 (5th
Cir. 1989) (holding that polygraph results are impeachment evidence for purposes of the
Brady rule).
20. Compare United States v. Clark, 622 F.2d 917, 917 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (Gee,
J., concurring) (arguing, in special concurrence joined by 11 other judges, that the status of
polygraph evidence should be reconsidered if it could be demonstrated that the polygraph
technique had improved in the years since Frye), with Dowd v. Calabrese, 585 F. Supp. 430
(D.D.C. 1984) (holding exculpatory polygraph results inadmissible under Frye and Federal
Rule of Evidence 403).
21. Three circuits have authorized the admission of stipulated polygraph evidence.
See United States v. Oliver, 525 F.2d 731, 736-37 (8th Cir. 1975); Brown v. Darcy, 783 F.2d
1389. 1391 (9th Cir. 1986); and United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529, 1536 (11th Cir.
1989) (also authorizing admission of unstipulated polygraph evidence in limited circum-
stances).
22. 57 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 1995) (decided June 20, 1995).
23. Shortly after Posado, two federal district courts followed the teaching of Daubert
and admitted exculpatory polygraph results after extensive reliability assessment hearings.
See United States v. Crumby, 895 F. Supp. 1354 (D. Ariz. 1995) (decided July 7, 1995):
United States v. Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. 877 (D.N.M. 1995) (decided Oct. 4, 1995).
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argument made by polygraph proponents-that polygraphy is a scien-
tific endeavor.
At issue in Posado was the admission of the results of a poly-
graph test that showed that the defendants in a drug possession
prosecution were not consciously lying when they denied giving con-
sent to police officers to open suitcases belonging to the defendants.24
The Fifth Circuit held that the trial court's denial of admission of the
result in a suppression hearing was error, because the trial court did
not conduct a Daubert hearing on the proponents' polygraph science
claim?2 However, the Posado court also announced its concern that
the testimony of the defendants' polygraph examiner might "have an
unusually prejudicial effect which is not justified by its probative
value." Further, the court stressed that the defendants' offer to col-
laborate with the prosecution in structuring a mutually acceptable
polygraph examination before they submitted to testing was one of
"several factors that may operate to counterbalance the potential
prejudicial effect of [the polygraph examiner's] testimony." 27
There is, of course, no logical connection between the fact that a
polygraph proponent offered to have a "collaborative" test and the
allegedly "unduly prejudicial effect" that evidence of the results of
the test might have upon the jury. Furthermore, the evaluation of the
probative force of otherwise admissible evidence is a task for the jury,
not the trial judge. Thus, if evidence of a specific polygraph test re-
sult is admissible as a reliable application of principles that constitute
scientific evidence it should be admitted without further standards
imposed by courts.'
Considering the existence or absence of "collaboration" as an
important factor to determine whether polygraph results are admissi-
ble is disturbingly similar to the position taken by many state courts
and three federal circuit courts admitting stipulated polygraph test re-
sults regardless of the scientific validity of polygraph testing in gen-
24. See Posado, 57 F.3d at 430-31.
25. See id. at 431-32.
26. kIL at 435.
27. i&
28. This is not to say that evidence of the degree of imprecision of polygraph testing
should not be admitted when offered by the opponent of the evidence. Such evidence is
obviously relevant and clearly admissible. It is also not to say that a trial court judge
should not go to some pains to require that any proffered polygraph test results be based
upon clearly relevant and unambiguous questions. Requiring that the polygraph test at
issue have used only such questions does avoid jury confusion and possible unduly preju-
dicial effect. In Posado, however, the questions were unambiguous and the answers rele-
vant. See id. at 428, 431.
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eral or the reliability of the specific test at issue.29 The collaboration
factor injects a consideration that is irrelevant to the issue of the va-
lidity of the polygraph science claim, while the per se admissibility of
stipulated test results completely negates any consideration of the sci-
ence claim. Nonetheless, the motivation for adopting the stipulation
and collaboration ideas is understandable. A primary reason for the
concern of courts about the validity of polygraph testing is the gener-
ally unexpressed judicial perception that such testing depends to an
uncomfortable degree upon the integrity and skill of the examiner. In
stipulated or collaborative testing the parties presumably are mutu-
ally satisfied with the examiner. This mutual satisfaction is undoubt-
edly perceived by some judges as an acceptable surrogate for mean-
ingful certification or some other method of insuring the reliability of
the examiner performing the test at issue.
The Fifth Circuit has restated the collaboration factor as an item
of importance in determining the admissibility of a particular testi0
and district courts in that circuit have followed in this direction)' On
the other hand, district court opinions in the Fifth Circuit show an in-
creasing attention to factors bearing on the reliability and underlying
scientific validity of the specific test results at issue)
H. Future Legal Developments If Polygraph Testing Does
Produce Scientific Evidence
A. The Immediate Future
If the assumption is made that polygraph testing in its present
form or in a slightly altered form does produce scientific evidence, se-
rious consideration of the science claim should result in admission of
reliable specific test results within a reasonably short period. There
29. See cases cited supra note 20 (federal circuit courts). Nineteen state courts have
followed the same rule of admissibility with regard to stipulated polygraphs. See McCall.
supra note 10, at 370-73.
30. See United States v. Pettigrew, 77 F.3d 1500, 1515 (5th Cir. 1996).
31. See United States v. Dominguez, 902 F. Supp. 737, 739 (S.D. Tex. 1995): United
States v. Zertouche-Tobias, 953 F. Supp. 803, 807 (S.D. Tex 1996). But see Ulmer v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 897 F. Supp. 299,303 (W.D. La. 1995) (holding that lack of collabo-
ration was insignificant when examiner was a disinterested public official not selected by
proponent).
32. See Zertouche-Tobias, 953 F. Supp. at 807 n.1 (inappropriate control question
used by examiner); United States v. Ramirez, 1995 WL 918083, at *2-3 (S.D. Tex. 1995)
(no activity monitor to detect countermeasures used in test).
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are, to be sure, a number of topics that must receive much more so-
phisticated judicial attention than has been the case up to now. These
include, at a minimum, the standardization of test formats, the elimi-
nation of subjective decisions by examiners, the efficacy of pre-test
desensitizing by subjects, the efficacy of countermeasures, and the re-
liability of detection of countermeasures. These topics present diffi-
cult issues, but all appear to be amenable to scientific investigation
and discovery. If courts can be led to address seriously the science
claim of polygraph proponents, these topics can be addressed through
adjudication, and the issues they present can be resolved by appellate
courts or through legislative intervention in the judicial process.
At this writing, the United States Supreme Court is considering
the arguments made in United States v. Scheffer and an opinion is ex-
pected within months if not weeks. At issue is whether an accused
has a constitutional right under the Obtaining Witnesses Clause of the
Sixth Amendment to present evidence of an exculpatory polygraph
test. Based upon its reading of Rock v. Arkansas,33 the Armed Forces
Court of Appeals held that such a right exists.-" Also based on its
reading of the Rock opinion, the court held that this right was arbi-
trarily denied by the per se prohibition of the admission of polygraph
evidence in military trials.35
It is possible to view the holding of Rock differently than did the
majority of the members of the Armed Forces Court of Appeals,36
and the Supreme Court may decide that the Obtaining Witnesses
Clause does not apply to polygraph evidence. Nonetheless, the
Court's opinion in Scheffer will stimulate professional interest in
polygraph testing. The fact that the Court will be discussing, for the
first time, this form of purported scientific evidence will in all likeli-
hood tend to legitimize full consideration of this evidence and the sci-
ence claim made by it proponents. This in turn will lead, over time, to
33. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
34. See United States v. Scheffer, 44 MJ. 442, 443 (C.A.A.F. 1996), cert. granted, 117
S. Ct. 1817 (1997).
35. See iL at 44546.
36. Rock involved a per se prohibition of admission of testimony about an event
given by a witness who had, on a previous occasion, been hypnotized to assist in recalling
the event. The accused had been so hypnotized and was precluded by the rule from testi-
fying in her own behalf. Rock held that she had a constitutional right to present herself as
a witness and testify, and that the right could not be arbitrarily denied. For a general dis-
cussion of the Rock opinion see McCall, supra note 10, at 392-94. Several courts have read
Rock as limited to the testimony of the accused and have held that Rock has no applica-
tion to the accused's rights to present any exculpatory evidence other than the accused's
own testimony. See McCall, supra note 10, at 406-09 for a discussion of this specific issue.
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the admission of polygraph evidence if, as is assumed for purposes of
this discussion, polygraphy is based on principles that constitute scien-
tific knowledge.
B. The Long Run Implications of Judicial Admission of Polygraph
Evidence as Incontestably Reliable Scientific Evidence
The one complete certainty if polygraph evidence becomes ad-
missible in American courts is that the United States Constitution will
still be the law of the land and that basic evidence law concepts will
continue to apply to all forms of proof in American courts. This
means that polygraph testing will not be forced upon persons accused
of crimes, although comment on their refusal to produce polygraph
evidence if they choose to testify at trial should be permissible. While
polygraph evidence presents no legitimate hearsay concerns,7 the risk
of confusion and time consumption will probably result in denial of
admission of polygraph test results of non-testifying witnesses. How-
ever, the Sixth Amendment rights of an accused might lead to a dif-
ferent result in criminal prosecutions."
III. The State v. Lyon Decision
A. The Majority Opinion
In State v. Lyon,39 the Oregon Supreme Court considered the ap-
peal of a murder conviction. The accused had entered into a pre-
polygraph test stipulation that the results would be admissible in evi-
dence in a future prosecution should such action be undertaken. The
test result was inculpatory, and the State offered it in evidence at trial.
The accused reneged on his stipulation and objected, but the trial
court ruled the evidence admissible. This trial court ruling was one of
three grounds of appeal raised by the accused, but it was almost the
37. See E. Imwinkelried & J. McCall, Issues Once Moot: The Other Evidentiary Ob-
jections to the Admission of Exculpatory Polygraph Examinations, 32 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1045, 1066-73 (1997).
38. The U.S. Supreme Court may announce the principle that Rock v. Arkansas ap-
plies to non-accused testimony in its forthcoming United States v. Scheffer opinion. (See
supra text at notes 32-35. In the unlikely event the Court does so, a general reexamination
of the application of FRE 403 to evidence offered by an accused will be required, and this
could lead to admission of evidence offered by the accused that might otherwise be seen as
capable of confusing the jury.
39. 744 P.2d 231,231 (Or. 1987).
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exclusive focus of the state supreme court's opinion in the case.4"
The court had held unstipulated polygraph evidence to be inad-
missible three years earlier on the ground that the evidence was un-
reliable.4t Although the issue of the admissibility of stipulated poly-
graph evidence had produced a sharp split among state courts ruling
on the issue42 the Oregon Supreme Court was unanimous in holding
that the admission of this form of evidence was reversible error. Be-
fore the test at issue was conducted, the parties had stipulated that
the test results be admitted in evidence. This stipulation, the court
noted, did not affect the reliability of the polygraph test. The court
had earlier concluded that polygraph tests without stipulation were
too unreliable to produce results that could be admitted in evidence,
and it now reasoned that the same must also be true of stipulated
tests.
B. The Concurring Opinion
The first point in Justice Linde's concurrence was an acknow-
ledgement of his full agreement with the majority opinion."u Linde
then posed the question of "whether there perhaps are wider reasons
for the result."' In essence, his answer was positive, and in explaining
it he developed a position that is unprecedented, at least as an ar-
ticulated concern, in American judicial reports. For the sake of
making his point, the Justice was willing to grant the science claim of
polygraph proponents. Even with that assumption, Justice Linde in-
dicated that he would very likely refuse to admit unquestionably reli-
able polygraph test results in evidence.
The unarticulated concern that has resulted in the American ju-
diciary's irrational resistance to serious consideration of the poly-
40. The accused also claimed that the trial court erred in admitting two other items of
evidence: a record of prior testimony he allegedly had been compelled to give before the
grand jury and hearsay testimony of statements made by the accused's father. The Ore-
gon Supreme Court held that the grand jury testimony had not been compelled and was
properly admitted, but that the admission of the hearsay testimony was reversible error.
See Lyon, 744 P.2d at 232,238.
41. See State v. Brown, 687 P.2d 751, 755 (Or. 1984). After a lengthy analysis of the
probative value of polygraph test results (762-72), the court concluded "that under proper
conditions polygraph evidence may possess some probative value and may, in some cases,
be helpful to the trier of fact." Id at 772. Nonetheless, the court held that all polygraph
evidence should be denied admission in Oregon courts for the usual three latter-day objec-
tions. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
42. See supra note 28.
43. See Lyon, 744 P.2d at 238.
44. Id
Apr. 1998]
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graph claim of science was captured in the Lyon concurring opinion.
There, Justice Linde states his doubt that admitting polygraph evi-
dence would be "consistent with the theory underlying our legal and
social institutions"45 and his belief that admitting accurate polygraph
evidence in court proceedings could be at "the cost of diminishing
[the] common humanity" of the American people. 6 These grave po-
tential consequences follow logically from Linde's belief that poly-
graph testing may be inconsistent "with fundamental tenets about
human personhood.
47
Before considering Linde's personhood argument, his prelimi-
nary points deserve examination. In making them, the Justice first
cites former Secretary of State George Schultz, who protested a 1985
presidential authorization for random polygraph testing of federal of-
ficials with access to confidential information. The Secretary's
statement to the effect that the polygraph program would be offen-
sive as a sign of lack of trust to him and others, is cited to show that
some objections to polygraph testing would be strong regardless of
whether such testing was undeniably reliable.
While Schultz's and Linde's point is undoubtedly true, it seems
irrelevant to a consideration of the use of reliable polygraph testing to
prove or disprove the credibility of crucial points of courtroom testi-
mony. The credibility of an important courtroom witness is almost
always a contested issue, and no witness takes the stand without the
expectation that an uncomfortable challenge of their trustworthiness
is a real possibility. On the other hand, the credibility of leading offi-
cials in the State Department and other federal agencies is seldom, if
ever, challenged by officials who appointed them.
Linde acknowledges the point that context and normal expecta-
tions are important to consider on the issue of the offensiveness of
any form of lie detection procedure. Thus he lists such situations as
applications for loans or responding to a police officer after a traffic
stop for erratic driving as situations in which one can expect one's
word not to be taken at face value. References or breathalyzer tests
may be required in such situations and if the borrower or test subjects
feels resentment, Linde believes it will be of a different order than the
resentment occasioned by polygraph testing.
45. Id. at 239.
46. Id. at 240.
47. Id.
48. The White House was concerned about unauthorized disclosures ("leaks") of in-
formation, and proposed the polygraph program to stop such disclosures.
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In his consideration of why polygraph testing is likely to produce
more resentment than more common procedures for detecting false-
hoods, Justice Linde acknowledges two important points. First, he
believes "[t]here is no general right to lie."4 9 Second, he states the
common sense proposition: "Of course the polygraph is not torture,
no more than an electrocardiogram, for instance." Both points
should be borne in mind in view of the sources relied upon by the Jus-
tice in the remainder of his opinion.
The principal reason for the difference in the amount and nature
of the resentment is, in Linde's opinion, that polygraph testing
"turn(s) the human body against the personality that inhabits it in a
way that other tests do not."5° By this, the Justice means several
things. First, while other tests "independently establish" facts, such as
amount of alcohol in the subject's system, the polygraph only deter-
mines if a statement by the subject was deceptive. Second, the poly-
graph, in order to perform the valuable function of detecting a lie,
"turns its subject into an object."'" Finally, while the objectification of
the subject is common to diagnostic tests of all sorts, Linde sees poly-
graph testing as different in kind because it "seems doubtful" that
polygraph testing is "consistent with the theory underlying our legal
and social institutions." 2
The first and second reasons given by Justice Linde for what he
seemingly views as the justified greater resentment felt by forensic
polygraph test subjects lack substance." The third reason he lists ap-
pears to be very substantial. For his third propostition, the Justice
cites the work of three scholars who have written on the
"[i]nconsistency of physiological lie detection with fundamental ten-
ets about human personhood [that] has been important in European
objections to the polygraph, reflecting Christian and Kantian philo-
49. Lyon, 744 P.2d at 239.
50. Id.
51. Id. Justice Linde notes that "the lie detector only purports to detect whether a
person is uttering a lie" which "[b]eyond doubt.., is often a useful thing to know." Id.
52. 1&
53. As to the first, polygraph tests can be said to "independently establish" facts
(pulse rate, skin conductivity, etc.) in exactly the same way other tests do. These "inde-
pendent facts" in turn reveal deception (according to polygraph proponents). The same
relationship between independent facts and conclusions about larger scale determinations
would seem to apply to DNA sequences that reveal parentage and breathalyzer readings
that reveal legal drunkenness.
On the second, Justice Linde admits that objectification is a commonplace in "many
diagnostic tests." Id.
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sophical traditions as much as doubts of its accuracy."54 Specific cita-
tions to the work of three scholars are marshalled in support of the
proposition. While one of the scholars, Alfred F. Westin, is almost
exclusively interested in the subject of American pre-employment
polygraph testing,55 the other two scholars do lend support to Justice
Linde's precise concerns, and provide direct support for his person-
hood argument.
IV. Justice Linde's Personhood Argument Against Admission
of Reliable Polygraph Evidence
A. The Scholarly Sources
The relevant scholarship noted by Justice Linde took the form of
a 1956 article in the Harvard Law Review written by Ms. Helen
Silving56 and a 1956 article in the Northwestern University Law Re-
view by Mr. Henry J. Kaganiec. 7 Both authors were comparativists,
familiar with German law and the German legal system, and both ar-
ticles discussed a then recent opinion of the West German Supreme
Court, B.G.H. St.5' The German opinion had held that the trial court
had improperly considered evidence59 of the inculpatory result of a
polygraph test taken by the accused in an embezzlement prosecution
that resulted in conviction.
Both Silving and Kaganiec approve of the opinion and their ex-
54. Lyon, 744 P.2d at 239-40.
55. In the cited work, ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 211-41 (1967), the
author focuses upon the work of the Moss Committee in the mid 1960s, which primarily
investigated the use of polygraph tests in employee screening in the federal government.
56. Ms. Silving was identified as a Research Assistant in Law, Harvard Law School in
her article, Helen Silving, Testing of the Unconscious in Criminal Cases, 69 HARV. L. REV.
683 (1956).
57. Mr. Kaganiec was identified as a Member of the Illinois Bar in his article, Henry
J. Kaganiec, Lie Detector Tests and "Freedom of the Will" in Germany, 51 Nw. U. L. REV.
446 (1956).
58. Judgment of Bundesgerichtshof (I. Strafsenat), Feb. 16, 1954, 5 Entscheidungen
des Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen [hereinafter B.G.H. St.] 332 , cited in Silving, su-
pra note 56, at 688-89 and Kaganiec, supra note 57, at 446.
59. See Kaganiec, supra note 57, at 446; Silving, supra note 56, at 688-89. German
courts, which sit without juries, generally admit much evidence that would be denied in
American courts. See N. FOSTER, GERMAN LAW & LEGAL SYSTEM 186-87 (1993). Only
very limited types of evidence are prohibited. See id. at 187.
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planations of its basic reasoning and support for it in German legal
commentary of the time are quite similar6 The opinion is based
upon the crucial German legal concept of "freedom of the will. 61
This freedom specifically includes the right of an accused to decide
whether, and in what manner, he or she will answer the charges
brought by the state. The taking of polygraph measurements of
physiological reactions beyond voluntary control will, according to
Kaganiec, "disclose the otherwise concealed psychic structure of the
accused and ... are an... attempt to discover what might be present
only in the unconscious of the accused." 62 Seen in this light, the poly-
graph records the equivalent of an involuntary communication of the
accused and "violates [the accused's] right to decide whether he wants
to answer the criminal charge." 63
On the issue of whether the accused should have the right to
have courts consider an exculpatory polygraph test result, Silving and
Kaganiec are of the same mind. The latter states:
The state has an affirmative duty ... to safeguard the human dig-
nity and free will. Thus, these rights [to be free of "involuntary dis-
closure of the unconscious" through polygraph testing] are of su-
per-individual concern and must be protected against infringements
by the individual himself as well as against encroachments by the
state authority. 64 (emphasis added).
Silving's recognition of the seriousness of the issue is also clear:
Of all arguments in favor of admitting objective testing, that in-
voked in behalf of an accused demanding such a test to prove his
innocence is the most challenging one. Rejection of this argument,
in fact, involves sacrifice of an essential ethical tenet, that man is an
ultimate value, not as a member of a species, but as an unique his-
torical event.65
Her resolution of the issue requires that "consideration of such
60. Kaganiec's article is fourteen pages long and discusses only the German opinion
and the commentary and philosophical traditions that support it. Silving's article is twenty
two pages long and, besides a description of the German opinion and its support in Ger-
man commentary, contains her argument that the German position on lie detector results
should be maintained in the United States under her reading of the Due Process Clause.
See Silving, supra note 56, at 690.
61. Silving discusses the concept and the points made in the remainder of the above
text paragraph. See id at 688-90. Kaganiec discusses the same topics at supra note 57, at
447-51.
62. Kaganiec, supra note 57, at 449.
63. Id. at 450.
64. Id at 450-51.
65. Silving, supra note 56, at 693.
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[individual] uniqueness is necessarily limited when it conflicts with
the regard due to other individuals., 66 Thus:
In cases of [such] conflicting claims, democratic law must give
precedence to the general "dignity of man" over the individual dig-
nity of a man. Human dignity in democratic law is not entirely a
personal attribute of the individual as an unique event but rather a
"virtue" accorded to the individual by law. 67
Therefore, the "unavoidable conflict between the interest of the
individual and imperative social interests" must be resolved in favor
of the general dignity of man and the accused should have no option
to have exculpatory polygraph test results considered. 6 Silving ac-
knowledges that "[t]here is, to be sure, a touch of collectivism in this
conception of 'civilization' being the source of individual right."69
She is also quite forthright in discussing the full extent of the ac-
cused's right to decide whether to answer the state's charge in both
French and German law. Contrary to the Anglo-American common
law on the matter, the continental concept of the accused's right to
determine his or her defense specifically includes the right of the ac-
cused to lie in court in support of that defense. 0
On a less important point, Silving is considerably less straight-
forward than Justice Linde. She discusses prohibitions against torture
in a manner that appears to assume that there are meaningful simi-
larities between torture and polygraphy." Justice Linde specifically
disavows any such suggestion.
The preceding discussion of the authorities cited by Justice Linde
indicate that some of the premises for the German position are not to
be found in American law.73 First, and most obviously, although the
accused in an American prosecution enjoys many rights, he or she
does not have carte blanche to decide how he or she will answer the
state's charge of criminal conduct. The accused in America has no
right to lie without penalty in presenting a defense. He or she must
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 694. While not as unmistakably clear on the point as Kaganiec, Silving's
language, which becomes oddly opaque at this point, permits of no other logical reading
other than the one in the above text.
69. Id. at 693.
70. See Silving, supra note 56. at 696 n.54.
71. See Silving, supra note 56, at 701-02.
72. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
73. While this would not be reason to disregard the German position, the lack of
similar premises does indicate that the German position is not likely to fit smoothly into
the fabric of American law.
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take an oath and is subject to perjury prosecution for false testimony.
This is evidence of a more intense commitment to truth in testimony
in this country than in Germany. If there is a societal concept of hu-
man dignity in Germany, there is certainly a societal commitment to
truth in American courtroom procedures.
Second, the basic concept of German criminal procedure, free-
dom of the will, is an almost boundless and undefinable concept when
compared with the basic general American concepts of due process of
law and equal protection of the laws. The German phrase evokes
metaphysical speculations that have no counterpart in traditional
American jurisprudence. This general observation leads to the spe-
cific point that it is almost impossible to conceive of the American
Supreme Court adopting any notion of freedom of the will that would
eliminate the ability of an accused to offer reliable crucial exculpatory
evidence to obtain his or her freedom from incarceration. The type
of logic involved in that exercise is generally foreign to American
courts.
Third, the German concept, as explicated by the commentators,
produces an extreme restraint on the freedom of the individual ac-
cused of a crime. American law, which reflects and helps to mold the
thinking of American society, places a very high value on individual
freedom in general and the specific freedom of those accused of a
crime to present the best defense possible, as long as it is consistent
with truth. It is unlikely that American courts would curtail those
freedoms in favor of an abstraction on the order of freedom of the
will.
B. Justice Linde's Personhood Argument
To Justice Linde it "seems doubtful" that polygraph testing is
consistent with either "the theory underlying our legal and social in-
stitutions" or "fundamental tenets about human personhood."'74  By
way of elaboration, he notes that "[t]he cherished courtroom drama
of confrontation, oral testimony and cross examination is designed to
let a jury pass judgment on [the] truthfulness [of witnesses] and on the
accuracy of their testimony."'75 This leads to the observation that "it
has long been argued" that the "cherished drama" "really serves
74. The three quoted phrases from three contiguous sentences at Lyon, 744 P.2d at
239-40.
75. Id. at 240.
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symbolic values more important than reliable fact finding."76 From
this he concludes that:
One of these implicit values surely is to see that parties and the
witnesses are treated as persons to be believed or disbelieved by
their peers rather than as electrochemical systems to be certified as
truthful or mendacious by a machine."
Thus, the admission of polygraph evidence would detract from
the personhood of the parties to a trial as well as the jurors who de-
cide crucial credibility issues, and, by extension, all members of soci-
ety. The Justice further writes:
A machine improved to detect uncertainty, faulty memory, or an
overactive imagination would leave little need for live testimony
and cross-examination before a human tribunal: an affidavit with
the certificate of a polygraph operator attached would suf-
fice .... Would a perfect detector enhance people's capacity to test
for truth only at the cost of diminishing their common humanity? 78
The chilling question concludes an argument well and strongly
stated. No one else has voiced this underlying concern in anything re-
sembling this form. If not convincing, at least to this author, Justice
Linde's opinion deserves notice, appreciation and, most importantly,
an answer.
V. A Response to the Personhood Argument
First, it may be the case that trials now seem to have other im-
plicit values, but it is not at all established that trials should not be
primarily concerned with establishing facts. The jury is, at least under
our criminal procedure system, free to disregard these "facts" if they
choose to do so. Second, polygraph evidence does not eliminate a
jury's opportunity to take "demeanor evidence" and give it whatever
weight they choose to. Unquestionably reliable polygraph evidence
would merely make it more likely, but not totally so, that jurors
would not rely upon their "take" on the credibility of a witness, when
the polygraph evidence on the issue differed markedly from the
opinion of the jurors. Third, polygraph evidence does not remove the
"right to lie," if it is assumed, and Justice Linde specifically rejects the
assumption, that "personhood" includes such a right. However, reli-
able polygraph evidence would certainly make it more difficult to lie
76. Id. Justice Linde cites, as an example of this view, ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF
GOVERNMENT 145 (1962).
77. Id.
78. Id.
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successfully.
Considering the larger issues raised by Justice Linde, the follow-
ing thoughts come to mind. If we assume that jurors know their own
"personhood" and are more sensitive to their own personhood being
diminished than would be any more distant observer, it follows that
the jurors themselves should have the choice of accepting or rejecting
the admitted polygraph evidence during jury deliberations. In fact, if
we are to treat jurors as adult, mature persons capable of exercising
judgment and discretion in important matters (which would certainly
appear to be the type of treatment of a person that enlarges person-
hood) should not the jury receive all reliable evidence relevant to the
issues they are to determine? Also on the subject of personhood, it
would seem that the accused should have the right to put any excul-
patory, undeniably reliable polygraph evidence in the record as one
aspect of his or her personal right to take rational steps to prove his
or her innocence and protect his or her person from incarceration.
Lastly, and returning to the idea that there are "implicit values"
in the law of evidence other than truthfully establishing facts, is there
any conceivable implicit value greater than requiring that all facts that
exculpate an accused be established? Most persons would answer in
the negative. The same logic would seemingly require that all facts
that inculpate an accused be introduced, because the public is entitled
to know who perpetrated a crime in order to protect innocent persons
from being falsely accused. While some persons might not agree that
the same primacy of truthful fact finding applies in civil litigation, it is
certain that if a referendum vote were conducted on the proposition
that undeniably reliable polygraph evidence should be admitted in
such actions, the vote by society would be overwhelmingly in favor of
the proposal.
Conclusion-An Optimistic View of Future Judicial
Assessment of Polygraph Evidence
All that is necessary for the past irrational judicial attitude to-
ward polygraph evidence to change is for courts to seriously confront
the claim by its proponents that polygraph testing produces scientific
knowledge. If this is done, it is by no means certain that present day
polygraph testing will be held to produce admissible evidence. How-
ever, if courts approach the issue of polygraph evidence admissibility
by requiring adequate proof of the scientific methodology underlying
the relevant principles and the procedure used in polygraph testing,
the history of the achievements of American science gives us reason
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to believe that the seemingly significant problems concerning poly-
graph theory and practice will either be solved or proven to have
been non-existent.
Due to Justice Linde's scrupulous intellectual self-awareness,
analytical skill and power of expression, the personhood argument
against serious consideration of polygraphy's science claim has been
articulated. In this author's opinion the argument should serve
merely to mandate a wholesome note of caution in judicial considera-
tion of the science claim, not to serve as an unarticulated basis for re-
sistance to undertaking such consideration.
